-Mathematical Philosopher with an obsessive nature and an unfortunate 'propensity' toward convolution and asking too many ((almost always) long winded and unreadable questions).

I am a formal philosophy,PHD student at the University of Queensland, Australia. My research consists studying the foundations, and philosophy of probability.

In particular the nature of single case objective chance (propensity) and its relation to logic and full belief. IN particular the principal principal why should ones credences match the objective chances.

This is Aiming at an 'utter reduction' (not extension) of 'probability to non probabilistic nomic/conditional logic' via dual mononoticity.

I try to answer at very least this question: "Why is one (guaranteed to be?) better, off, on the single case, using the single case alone, without indifference or frequency principles, having your subjective credences in line with the objective chances.?

-My Research Consists in a novel model of single case chance (ontic single case in-deterministic chance) on

A novel analysis of maximal specificity and the reference class and based on an extended Fetzer-Nute conception of permanent and transient properties and dispositions with ties to connections to the work of R Giles and Van Fraassen, and Igal Kvart, some Everettians

Most importantly a novel analysis of single case chance which consists in the notion of a resistance parameter with highly contextual aspects which connections propensities values to logic, and our doxastic attitudes. The Principal Principle of David Lewis. Using a weird mind to world contextual connection between Propensities, belief and the novel resistance concept.

This makes for an analysis of rational objective credence as as that of having higher credences in outcomes which (come what may) cannot be fail to be false (in one sense) whilst still having the possibility of being false (if it comes out false, so would have the other belief you have have had, as the outcome would be changed due to the interaction between belief propensity and resistance).

• It also makes for an analysis of the actualist consistency PP- ie why one should come to know the chances, rather than have credence in line with what you think the chances are.

• This part is finalized via a numerical respresentation and unique-ness result which serves to justify the numerical PP (ie that your credences should not respect the rank ordering of the propensity values,but their precise value). For three or more outcomes, the result appears to quite easy and somewhat gleason-esque. Otherwise for two outcomes it is more difficult and involves a symmetry relation.

• it also aim at resolving the relative frequency connection in the finite and long run, as well as the corresponding inverse inference,a dn the ordering problem